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THE UNFINISHED WORK OF THE 
INSTRUMENTALISTS 
Willard Hurst* 
!NSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY. By Robert Sa-
muel Summers. Ithaca, N.Y. and London: Cornell University Press. 
1982. Pp. 295. $24.50. 
In Instrumentalism and American Legal Theory, Professor Sum-
mers undertakes to define and criticize an influential body of 
thought about legal order which he terms "pragmatic instrumental-
ism." Though he does not confine his study to four men, he centers 
on the work of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Roscoe Pound, -John 
Dewey, and Karl N. Llewellyn. None of these writers produced an 
integrated theory of law broad enough to fulfill the potentials of the 
themes they sounded. But Summers is persuasive that their work 
tended to form a common pattern. His book - a contribution both 
to jurisprudence and to the history of ideas - helps fill out the con-
tent of the pattern which these philosophers left only partly finished. 
The author identifies the distinctive content of pragmatic instru-
mentalism in part through its contrasts with three other currents in 
Western legal theory - analytical positivism, natural law, and his-
torical jurisprudence. Analytical positivism has focused on the logi-
cal implications of concepts regarded as giving authoritative form to 
a system of law, such as ideas of rights, duties, or sovereignty. In-
strumentalism ,has focused more on tracing the use and efficacy of 
law as a means toward achieving social goals. Natural law philoso-
phy has measured positive law by criteria of justice, rightness or 
goodness to be realized through legal processes. Instrumentalism 
has tended to measure uses of law relative to wants in fact felt or 
desires in fact held by popular majorities, or at least by politically 
effective sectors of society. Historical jurisprudence - not a prime 
element in this country's legal thought - has sought to identify val-
ues legitimated by usage and by the cumulative experience of a peo-
ple. Instrumentalists have been more interested in employing and 
understanding law in the here-and-now setting of a given time and 
place. Summers seems right in rating instrumentalism - as marked 
out by its contrasts to these other currents - as a fourth major 
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strand in the history of Western legal thought. The assessment will 
be convincing to most of those whose law studies were colored by the 
legal realist movement of the late 1920's and early 1930's and who 
have known law school curricula shaped largely by efforts to expose 
law's functional relations to other social institutions or processes. 
The men whose work Summers surveys set in motion many fresh 
courses of ideas, research, and instruction, and stirred much contro-
versy. In this light Summers' account is striking in its demonstration 
of how relatively sketchy and incomplete was the sum of their prod-
uct; this insight is the prime contribution of this book. Anyone who 
has had much direct or indirect exposure to the influence of the in-
strumentalist approach will find that a good deal of what is set out 
here is familiar. However, Summers' task requires that he provide 
these familiar settings in order to bring into relief both the construc-
tive and the limiting aspects of the instrumentalist tradition. I imag-
ine that I am not alone in having found challenge in the kinds of 
writing Summers deals with, and at the same time having wished 
that they gave me more. These writers were most persuasive as crit-
ics; they were less satisfying in what they supplied to make good 
what they displaced. By outlining the important gaps in their theory, 
Summers provides suggestive indicators for work which might fill 
out what the instrumentalists began. In one perspective his book is a 
useful study in the history of twentieth century legal thought in this 
country; in another, it is a contribution to research design. 
At the heart of instrumentalist thinking has been its future-re-
garding insistence that people in this society seek to use law to 
achieve practical social goals. This attitude has expressed itself and 
has found encouragement in metaphors of social engineering. But 
the instrumentalists did not match this ends-and-means orientation 
with equal enthusiasm for exploring the legitimacy as well as the 
sources of the social goals that lawmakers pursued. With some war-
rant Summers argues that instrumentalists tended to settle for goals 
established mainly in quantitative terms: law should serve those 
ends in fact desired by popular majorities, or at least by politically 
effective interests. This approach avoids - or evades - setting 
qualitative criteria for choosing goals to be served by law, and hence 
also tends to promote rather narrow efficiency measures for validat-
ing means adopted to pursue goals. From this perspective there has 
been unresolved tension between the natural law and the instrumen-
talist traditions. Pragmatic analysts shy off from the unacceptable 
vagueness or rationalizations of undisclosed premises they find in 
appeals to natural law. Yet a stubborn fact in this society's legal 
tradition has been the persistence of the idea and the ideal of consti-
tutionalism. A constitutional legal order asserts that all uses of 
power in society should be subject to some effective criteria of values 
beyond majority vote or the will of immediate holders of power. 
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Summers does not choose quite these terms in observing that instru-
mentalist literature has scanted qualitative analysis. But tension 
with constitutionalism fits his diagnosis, and suggests an important 
limitation of the instrumentalist achievement. 
Summers fairly notes that instrumentalist thinking emphasized 
the roles of judges in making and carrying out public policy. Judge-
made law bulked large in nineteenth-century development of legal 
doctrine. Against that background it was understandable that 
pragmatically-inclined philosophers centered on the work of courts 
- chiefly on the work of appellate courts, but to some extent also on 
what went on at the trial level. But to understand is not to justify the 
extent of their concentration on the judicial process, particularly 
when they wrote in the twentieth century context in which legislators 
and executive and administrative officers were rapidly taking the 
lead in lawmaking. There was passing reference to growth of statute 
and administrative law, but this was not the prime subject of atten-
tion. Even Summers tends to emphasize courts. However, he does a 
good job of outlining the range and diversity of goals which people 
may seek to define and legitimize through legal processes, and the 
material effects that choice of means may have on the content of 
goals. Of like breadth is his catalog of contemporary techniques 
which lawmakers employ to carry out their purposes - encouraging 
private arrangement of affairs, providing civil remedies for griev-
ances, distributing publicly supplied goods and services, creating 
standards and rules to channel behavior under licenses or other reg-
ulatory devices, and prohibiting some conduct under penal sanc-
tions. The range of his inventories explicitly and implicitly reckons 
with a legal order in which legislative, executive, and administrative 
processes loom large alongside judicial processes. The particulars of 
his catalogs are not new; Roscoe Pound's zeal in classification led 
him to elaborate analogous lists of interests fostered or protected by 
law.1 But Summers' analysis serves a distinctive function, casting 
into sharp relief the relatively few categories upon which instrumen-
talist writings dwelt. 
Summers finds a third limitation of the instrumentalists' contri-
bution in their na'ive optimism about the capacity of scholars to find 
facts to measure the effects of using law. Confident that they could 
capture the realities of law in action, they were the more confident 
that lawmakers could be effective social engineers. They underesti-
mated the difficulties of measuring achievement not only of immedi-
ate goals of policy but also of intermediate or ultimate objectives. 
They underestimated the difficulty of determining to what extent law 
was a distinctive cause in situations where factors other than law 
might be at play. They underestimated the difficulties of studying 
I. E.g., Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 51 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1943). 
February 1984] The Instrumentalists 855 
the effects of using law in the face of limits set by cost, by political 
objections to controlled social experiments, and by lack of means to 
measure intangible elements often critical in social experience. Be-
yond such limits lay issues which bring us back to the fact that much 
instrumentalist literature tended to avoid dealing with qualitative 
judgments. To try to measure law's efficiency is worthwhile. But the 
fact that a use of law may efficiently produce a desired result does 
not establish that the result is one that a just and humane society 
should want. Again, Summers raises pertinent questions about the 
limits as well as the strengths of the instrumentalist tradition. 
Over the past thirty years scholars have given increasing atten-
tion to the successes of special interests in determining uses of law at 
the expense of broadly shared but less effectively represented values. 
This emphasis probably derives from the emergence of legislation 
and executive and administrative rules and orders as the principal 
types of lawmaking. Tensions between general and special interests 
have figured also in the development of judge-made law, but the 
growth of common law has relied on the focused energies of particu-
lar litigants to provide occasions of lawmaking - a setting which 
tends to obscure the presence of group interests. Since instrumental-
ist thought concentrated on the work of courts, it is not surprising 
that its exponents did not press far in examining challenges which 
special interest pressures posed to the legitimacy of other types of 
law. This is a limiting aspect of instrumentalism which Summers 
does not explore in the degree that its importance would seem to 
warrant. 
Fifty years ago Karl Llewellyn delivered a devastating critique of 
an over-generalized identification of a "school" of jurisprudential 
analysis where in fact existed substantial diversity and differences of 
views.2 While reading so ambitiously broad a survey as that 
presented by Summers, one must be somewhat uneasily conscious of 
Llewellyn's warning. Specialists more qualified than I may find par-
ticular quarrels with Summers' identification of dominant trends and 
themes among his pragmatic instrumentalists. But he does not fall 
into the style of generalization for which Llewellyn criticized Pound; 
to a reassuring degree Summers backs his generalizations with speci-
fications. Overall, he is helpful in the range of elements he invites us 
to consider in surveying this legal order. He persuasively documents 
the presence of some important shared themes among writers who 
have greatly influenced contemporary jurisprudence. It is a valuable 
contribution to sensitize readers to the limits as well as the accom-
plishments of this important group. 
2. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism - Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HAR.v. L. 
R.Ev. 1222 (1931). 
